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ABSTRACT
To continuously improve quality and reflect changes in data, ma-
chine learning applications have to regularly retrain and update
their core models. We show that a differential analysis of language
model snapshots before and after an update can reveal a surpris-
ing amount of detailed information about changes in the training
data. We propose two newmetrics—differential score and differential
rank—for analyzing the leakage due to updates of natural language
models. We perform leakage analysis using these metrics across
models trained on several different datasets using different meth-
ods and configurations. We discuss the privacy implications of our
findings, propose mitigation strategies and evaluate their effect.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, deep learning has made sufficient progress
to be integrated into intelligent, user-facing systems, which means
that machine learning models are now part of the software develop-
ment lifecycle. As part of this cycle, models are regularly updated
to accommodate three different scenarios:
• data update, to improve performance when new and more
data becomes available;
• data specialization, to fine-tune a model towards a specific
dataset, or to handle distributional shift as usage patterns
change; or
• data deletion, to respect user requests for removal of their
data.
Motivated by these scenarios, we study privacy implications for
text data that is added (or removed) during retraining of genera-
tive natural language models (LMs). Specifically, we consider an
adversary who obtains access to multiple snapshots of a model and
wishes to learn information about differences in the data used to
train them. This threat model is motivated by the combination of
three factors: (1) the current trend to fine-tune pretrained public
high-capacity LMs to smaller private datasets; (2) the established
ability of such LMs to memorize out-of-distribution training sam-
ples [4]; and (3) the widespread deployment of LMs to end-user
systems (e.g., predictive keyboards on smartphones), allowing ad-
versaries to analyze them in detail.
We show that data that is added or removed between model
updates can be extracted in this threat model, having severe impli-
cations for deploying machine learning models trained on private
data. Some of the implications are counter-intuitive: for example,
honoring a request to remove a user’s data (as per GDPR) from the
training corpus can mean that their data becomes exposed by re-
leasing an updated model trained without it. Similarly, fine-tuning
a public snapshot of a high-capacity model (e.g., BERT [6] or GPT-
2 [15]) with data from a single organization exposes this additional
data to anyone who obtains access to both the fine-tuned model
and the original public model (e.g., employees of this organization).
In order to extract information about the difference in the data
used to train two language models, we develop a novel notion of
differential score. The differential score of a token sequence cap-
tures the difference between the probability that each of the two
models assigns to it. The intuition is that token sequences with the
highest differential score are likely to have been added during a
model update. We devise an algorithm based on beam search that
efficiently identifies such token sequences, even if the individual
models assign low probability to them. This algorithm allows us to
recover information about the difference between the datasets used
for training without any background knowledge of their contents
or distribution.
When given some background knowledge, the advantage of
having access to two model snapshots becomes crisper. For ex-
ample, we train a recurrent neural network (RNN) on 20M to-
kens of general Reddit comments, and update it by retraining it
on these comments plus 25K tokens from 940 messages of the
talk.politics.mideast newsgroup. When prompted with the
word “Turkey”, our algorithm produces “Turkey searched an Amer-
ican plane” as the 2nd most likely result, although this phrase occurs
only 6 times in newsgroup messages and none in Reddit comments
(that is, it represents less than 0.000002% of the training data). An
equivalent search using only the updated network does not produce
this sentence among the top 10,000 results; it would take the longer
prompt “Turkey searched an” for this phrase to surface to the top
100 results.
We perform experiments where we use differential score to study
the effect of changes to the training data in the three scenarios
mentioned above. As a proxy for the updated dataset, we perform
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experiments using synthetically generated sentences (or canaries)
and real-world sentences from newsgroup messages. Using both
canaries and real-world data, we analyze the effect on leakage
of (1) different training types for model updates, ranging from
retraining a model from scratch with an updated dataset to fine-
tuning as is common for modern high-capacity language models;
(2) the proportion of private and public data used for the update;
and (3) an adversary’s background knowledge. For robustness, we
consider datasets of different sizes on both RNNs as well as modern
transformer architectures.
Summary of Contributions. We present the first systematic study
of the privacy implications of releasing snapshots of language mod-
els trained on overlapping data. The results we obtain validate that
model updates pose a substantial risk to content added to training
data in terms of information leakage.1 Our key findings are:
• By comparing two models, an adversary can extract specific
sentences or fragments of discourse from the difference between
the data used to train them. This does not require any information
about the training data or the model architecture and is possible
even when the change to the data is as small as 0.0001% of the orig-
inal dataset. Smaller changes become exposed when given partial
knowledge about the data.
• We show that analyzing two model snapshots reveals sub-
stantially more about the data that was added or removed than
considering only a single snapshot at a time, as in [4].
• Adding or removing additional non-sensitive training data
between model updates is not a reliable method to hide data that
should be kept private.
• Training with differential privacy mitigates the attack, but
incurs substantial computational cost and reduces the utility of the
trained models.
• Restricting access to the model by providing clients with a
subset of prediction results is a promising mitigation as it reduces
the effectiveness of our attack without reducing utility of the model.
These findings apply to models that are fine-tuned on a smaller
dataset, as well as models that are retrained on the union of original
and new data.
Structure of the Paper. We provide background on language mod-
els and describe our adversary model and attack scenarios in the
next section. We define the notion of differential score and describe
how to efficiently approximate it in Section 3. In Section 4 we de-
scribe our experiments to analyze the effect of different factors on
leakage. In Section 5 we investigate the source of leakage in model
updates, e.g., by comparing with leakage from access to only a
single model. Finally, we consider mitigation strategies in Section 6,
before describing related work and concluding.
2 ADVERSARY MODEL AND SCENARIOS
2.1 Generative Language Models
We consider machine learning models capable of generating natural
language. These models are used in a variety of applications, includ-
ing automatic caption generation, language translation, and next-
word prediction. Generative language models usually operate on a
1Notice that our findings hold also for the content that is removed, simply by swapping
the models.
fixed set of known tokensT (often referred to as the model’s vocabu-
lary) and are autoregressive, modeling the probability p(t1 . . . tn ) of
a sequence of tokens t1 . . . tn ∈ Tn as the product of the per-token
probabilities conditional on their prefix p(ti | t1 . . . ti−1), i.e.,
p(t1 . . . tn ) =
∏
1≤i≤n
p(ti | t1 . . . ti−1).
Training an autoregressive generative language model M hence
requires learning a function (which we also refer to asM) that maps
token sequences of arbitrary length to a probability distribution
over the vocabulary T , modeling the likelihood of each token to
appear next. We will useM(t<i ) to denote the probability distribu-
tion over tokens computed by modelM after reading the sequence
t1 . . . ti−1 ∈ T ∗, and M(t<i )(ti ) to denote the probability of a spe-
cific token ti .
Given such a modelM , a simple predictive screen keyboard can
be implemented by feedingM the words typed so far (e.g., from the
start of the current sentence) and displaying the, say, three most
likely tokens as one-tap options to the user.
A variety of different architectures exist for the generation of
natural language using machine learning models. The most promi-
nent are Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) using Long Short-Term
Memory [10] cells (or variants thereof) and the more recent Trans-
formers [15, 21]. These architectures differ substantially in how they
implement the modeling of the per-token probability distribution,
but as our experiments will show, they behave nearly identically
for the purposes of our analysis.
Given a model architecture, a dataset D ⊆ T ∗ is required as train-
ing data to obtain a concrete model. We write MD to emphasize
that a model was trained on a dataset D. Throughout the paper,
we will use the standard measure of perplexity perpM (t1 . . . tn ) =
pM (t1 . . . tn )
−1
n of a modelM on test data t1 . . . tn , using the prob-
ability pM (t1 . . . tn ) assigned to the sequence by modelM . Unlike
the more familiar accuracy, which only captures the correctness of
the most probable choice, this metric captures models being “almost
right.” Intuitively, perplexity can be thought as how “surprised” a
model is by a next-word choice, and hence, lower perplexity values
indicate a better match between data and model.
2.2 Adversary Model
Language models are regularly updated for a variety of reasons,
either by adding and/or removing data from the training set. We use
the term model update to refer to any update in the parameters of
the model caused by training on different data. This is distinct from
an update to the model architecture, which changes the number or
use of parameters. Each update creates a new version of the model,
which we refer to as a snapshot.
We consider an adversary that has concurrent query access
to two snapshots, MD and MD′ , of a language model trained on
datasets D and D ′ respectively, where D ⊊ D ′. We writeM ,M ′ as
shorthand for MD , MD′ . The adversary can query the snapshots
with any sequence s ∈ T ∗ and observe the corresponding proba-
bility distributionsM(s) andM ′(s). The adversary’s goal is to infer
information about D ′ \ D, the difference between D and D ′. We
refer to an adversary who has access to two snapshots of the model
as a snapshot attacker.
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2.3 Analysis Scenarios
To guide our analysis, we focus on three concrete scenarios in which
an adversary can gain concurrent access to two (or more) snapshots
of a language model.
Data Updates. Many applications require language models that
reflect recent patterns in language use. For example, a predictive
keyboard on a mobile device requires regular updates to suggest
terms that have become more common recently (e.g., following
news trends or internet memes). To achieve this, vendors often
regularly retrain an (otherwise unchanged) model on an updated
dataset, for example by simply adding more recent data to the
training dataset. In such cases, an adversary can easily gain access
to two snapshotsMD andMD′ with D ⊊ D ′ and may be interested
in learning details about the update D ′ \ D. We will show that we
can extract entire sentences from this difference by comparingMD
andMD′ , revealing not only aggregate user behavior, but specific
conversations.
Data Specialization. Some applications with little task-specific
data build on top of generic, pretrained high-capacity language
models such as GPT-2 [15]. In such settings, training starts from
the pretrained model, but then uses a significantly smaller pri-
vate dataset. As an example, an organization could simply use a
publicly available off-the-shelf language model to create an email
authoring autocompletion system. However, by additionally train-
ing the model with some historical email data, it can be adapted
to organization-specific terms, acronyms and concepts. In such a
scenario, if an adversary can gain access to the specialized model
M ′, they can easily also obtain the (publicly available) model M
used as a basis.
We will show that by treating these as different snapshots of the
same model, the adversary can extract parts of the private dataset
used for specialization.
User Data Deletion. Art. 17 of GDPR Right to erasure (“right to be
forgotten”) gives data owners the right to request erasure of their
personal data from a party who has collected and processed it.2
Language models trained on emails, text messages and other user-
generated content may contain personal information that a user
can at any point request to delete. Though some models that use
personal data may only be available internally to the data collector’s
organization, there are numerous scenarios where the models are
released either to the public or to other users via services provided
by the data collector (e.g., text prediction and auto-correct services
in text editors and mobile keyboards). In order to comply with the
regulation, the data collector would be required to delete the user’s
data and retrain any models in which this data had been used.
This scenario also falls into our adversary setting, albeit in re-
verse chronological order. Here the dataset D ′ contains the data
that will be deleted, whilst D does not (i.e., the difference D ′ \ D
represents the user’s data). With access to MD and MD′ , the at-
tacker can attempt to infer the user’s data. Even if the retrained
model overwrites the old model, it may not be possible to erase all
instances of the old model simultaneously. For example, some users
2https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr/
may be slow to download the new version or the old model may
have been copied by other parties.
Naturally, this scenario can be extended to other settings where
data is deleted between model updates. Though not considered in
this paper, this scenario raises an interesting question on whether
deletion of data is in the user’s best interest or if it makes their data
more susceptible to information leakage.
3 NEWMETRICS
We introduce two metrics called differential rank and differential
score to analyze data exposure between two snapshots of a genera-
tive language model.
3.1 Differential Score and Differential Rank
We aim to identify token sequences whose probability differs most
between models M and M ′. Intuitively, such sequences are most
likely to be related to the differences between their corresponding
training datasets D and D ′.
To capture this notion formally, we define the differential score
(DS) of token sequences, which is simply the sum of the differences
of (contextualized) per-token probabilities. We also define a relative
variant D˜S based on the relative change in probabilities, which we
found to be more robust w.r.t. the noise introduced by different
random initializations of the modelsM andM ′.
Definition 3.1. Given two language models M,M ′ and a token
sequence t1 . . . tn ∈ T ∗, we define the differential score of a token
as the increase in its probability and the relative differential score
as the relative increase in its probability. We lift these concepts to
token sequences by defining
DSM
′
M (t1 . . . tn ) =
n∑
i=1
M ′(t<i )(ti ) −M(t<i )(ti ) ,
D˜S
M ′
M (t1 . . . tn ) =
n∑
i=1
M ′(t<i )(ti ) −M(t<i )(ti )
M(t<i )(ti ) .
The differential score of a token sequence is best interpreted
relative to that of other token sequences. This motivates ranking
sequences according to their differential score.
Definition 3.2. We define the differential rank DR(s) of s ∈ T ∗ as
the number of token sequences of length |s | with differential score
higher than s .
DR(s) =
{s ′ ∈ T |s | DSM ′M (s ′) > DSM ′M (s) }
The lower the differential rank of a sequence, the more the se-
quence is exposed by a model update, with the most exposed se-
quence having rank 0.
3.2 Approximating Differential Rank
Computing the differential rank DR(s) of a sequence s of length
|s | = n requires searching a space of size |T |n . To avoid this expo-
nential blow-up, we rely on Algorithm 1, which approximates the
differential rank based on beam search.
At iteration i , the algorithm maintains a set S of k (called the
beam width) candidate sequences of length i , together with their
differential scores. The algorithm iterates over all possible k · |T |
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single-token extensions of these sequences, computes their differ-
ential scores, and keeps the k highest-scoring sequences of length
i+1 among them for the next step. Eventually, the search completes
and returns the set S .
Algorithm 1 Beam search for Differential Rank
In:M,M ′=models, T=tokens, k=beam width, n=length
Out: S=set of (n-gram, DS ) pairs
1: S ← {(ϵ, 0)} ▷ Initialize with empty sequence ϵ
2: for i = 1 . . .n do
3: S ′ ← {(s ◦ t , r + DSM ′M (s)(t)) | (s, r ) ∈ S, t ∈ T }
4: S ← take(k, S′) ▷ Take top k items from S ′
5: return S = {(s1, r1), . . . , (sk , rk )} such that r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rk
Algorithm 1 returns a set of token sequences s , together with
their differential score r . With this we can approximate the dif-
ferential rank DR(s) by the number of token sequences in S with
differential score higher than s . For large enough beam widths this
yields the true rank of s . For smaller beam widths, the result is
a lower bound on DR(s), as the search may miss sequences with
higher differential score than those in S .
Proposition 3.3. If Algorithm 1 returns a set
S = {(s1, r1), . . . , (sk , rk )} with r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rk ,
then DSM
′
M (si ) = ri and DR(si ) ≥ i − 1.
Optimizing for Speed. The beam width k governs the trade-off
between computational cost and the precision of the approxima-
tion. In experiments, we found that shrinking the beam width as
the search progresses speeds up the search considerably without
compromising on the quality of results. Typically, we use a beam
width |T |, which we halve at each iteration. That is, we consider
|T | /2 candidate phrases of length two, |T | /4 sequences of length
three, and so on.
Optimizing for Diversity. Since the sequences returned by vanilla
beam search typically share a common prefix, we rely on group
beam search as a technique for increasing diversity: we split the
initial |T | one-token sequences into multiple groups according to
their differential score, and run parallel beam searches extending
each of the groups independently. See [22] for more sophisticated
techniques for increasing diversity.
4 LEAKAGE ANALYSIS
We use our new metrics to perform leakage analyses for various
datasets across various model update scenarios. We first describe
our benchmark datasets with their model configurations and the
model training scenarios we consider. Then, we discuss research
questions relevant to the analysis scenarios described in Section 2.3.
We then show experiments investigating these questions in detail,
first using synthetically generated canaries as a proxy for updates
where we can precisely control the differences between the datasets
used to create model snapshots, and then in a realistic setting, in
which we use a set of standard real-world datasets.
4.1 Datasets and Models
We consider three datasets of different size and complexity, matched
with standard model architectures whose capacity we adapted to
the data size and implemented in TensorFlow. We will release the
source code as well as analysis tools used in our experimental
evaluation.
Concretely, we use the Penn Treebank [12] (PTB) dataset as
a representative of low-data scenarios, as the standard training
dataset has only around 900 000 tokens and a vocabulary size of
10 000. As the corresponding model, we use a two-layer recurrent
neural network using LSTM cells with 200-dimensional embeddings
and hidden states and no additional regularization (this corresponds
to the small configuration of Zaremba et al. [24]).
Second, we use a dataset of Reddit comments with 20 million
tokens overall, of which we split off 5% as validation set. We use a
vocabulary size of 10 000. We rely on two different model configu-
rations for this dataset, which allows us to understand the impact
of model size on information leakage using DR as a metric.
(1) a one-layer RNN using an LSTM cell with 512-dimensional
hidden states and 160-dimensional embeddings. We use
dropout on inputs and outputs with a keep rate of 0.9 as
regularizer. These parameters were chosen in line with a
neural language model suitable for next-word recommen-
dations on resource-constrained mobile devices.
(2) a model based on the Transformer architecture [21] (more
concretely, using the BERT [6] codebase) with four layers
of six attention heads, each with a hidden dimension of 192.
Finally, we use the Wikitext-103 dataset [14] with 103 million
training tokens as a representative of a big data regime, using a
vocabulary size of 20 000. As the model, we employ a two-layer
RNN with 512-dimensional LSTM cells and token embedding size
512 and dropout on inputs and outputs with a keep rate of 0.9 as
regularizer. We combined this large dataset with this (relatively
low-capacity) model to test if our results still hold on datasets that
clearly require more model capacity than is available.
All models and their training are following standard best prac-
tices for generative language models and represent common (sim-
ple) baselines used in experiments on the used datasets. This can
be seen in the perplexity of the trained models on the held-out test
data, shown in Table 1, which is in line with common test results.
4.2 Implementing Model Updates
Updated models can be created using different techniques, with
different applicability to the usage and analysis scenarios discussed
in Section 2.3.
Retraining. Given an updated dataset D ′, a fresh model snapshot
M ′ can be obtained by simply training a fresh model from scratch,
which we refer to as retraining. This also involves a fresh (random)
initialization of the model parameters, and in practice, retraining a
model repeatedly on the same dataset will yield slightly different
models.
The User Deletion scenario legally requires retraining for model
updates, as all data stemming from users requesting deletion needs
to be pruned from the dataset D ′. This is because there is no known
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effective way of deleting user-specific information from previously
trained model parameters apart from a handful of special cases [9].
Continued Training. In this approach, a fresh model snapshotM ′
is obtained by taking an existing modelM and continuing training
it on additional data. This is the core of the data specialization
scenario and sometimes also used in data update scenarios to avoid
the computational cost of training on a large dataset from scratch.
4.3 Research Questions
With the training techniques outlined for different model update
scenarios, we consider four research questions in our experiments.
RQ0: Can an attacker learn private information frommodel
updates? Here we address the basic question of whether private
data used to update a model can be leaked in our adversarial setting
and how. We first answer this question by using differential score
to find information about private sequences used in a model update.
We then investigate the influence of other parameters of the system
on the differential score in more detail.
RQ1: How does masking private data with additional non-
sensitive data (Dextra) affect leakage? This is particularly impor-
tant for the user deletion scenario, for which we need to answer if
it is possible to safely remove data of a single user, or if such dataset
changes need to be hidden among other substantial changes. Con-
cretely, we analyze whether including a large enough additional
dataset Dextra in an update can prevent leakage of information
about the rest of the data used. Dextra can be any dataset which is
either available publicly or is non-sensitive from the point of view
of the model provider or users.
RQ2: How do retraining and continued training differ with
respect to information leakage? In the continued training ap-
proach, the parameters of a previously trained modelMD are up-
dated based only on new data D ′ \ D. In contrast, in the retraining
strategy parameters are updated using all data in D ′. The most
recent updates to model parameters depend only on new data in
the continuing training case, whereas they depend on the whole
training data D ′ when retraining a model from scratch. We analyze
the effect of this seemingly more pronounced dependence.
RQ3: How is leakage affected by an adversary’s background
knowledge? Prior attacks on language models assume that the
adversary has background knowledge about the context in which a
secret appears. We analyze the effect of such knowledge for infer-
ring private data from model updates.
4.4 Results with Canaries
We create a number of canary phrases—grammatically correct
phrases that do not appear in the original dataset—that serve as a
proxy for private data that the adversary is trying to extract. We
consider different word frequency characteristics to control the
influence on the used vocabulary.
Specifically, we fix the length of the canary phrase to 5, choose
a valid phrase structure (e.g., Subject, Verb, Adverb, Compound
Object), and instantiate each placeholder with a token in a dataset
vocabulary. We create canaries in which frequencies of tokens are
all low (all tokens are from the least frequent quintile of words),
mixed (one token from each quintile), increasing from low to high,
and decreasing from high to low.
For example, the mixed phrase across all the datasets is “NASA
used deadly carbon devices”, and the all low phrase for PTB is
“nurses nervously trusted incompetent graduates”. As the vocab-
ularies differ between the different datasets, the canaries are in
general dataset-dependent.
We vary the amount of private data, C , by inserting a canary
phrase s a number of times proportional to the number of tokens
in the training corpus:
(1) For PTB, we consider k ∈ {10, 50, 100} canary insertions
(corresponding to 1 canary token in 18K training tokens, 1 in 3.6K,
and 1 in 1.8K).
(2) For the Reddit dataset, we usek ∈ {5, 50, 500} (corresponding
to 1 in 1M, 1 in 100K, 1 in 10K).
(3) For the Wikitext-103 data, we use k ∈ {20, 100} (correspond-
ing to 1 in 1M, 1 in 200K).
We train the model M on D and the model M ′ on D with k
copies of the canary s . We then compute the differential rank of the
canaries for different values of k .
RQ0: Can an attacker learn private information from model up-
dates? Weuse our differential score based beam search (Algorithm 1)
to extract canary phrases that correspond to the change in train-
ing data between M and M ′. The results of varying the number
of inserted canaries are summarized in Table 1. We highlight the
following findings:
• For most combinations of k and types of canaries, we
successfully recover the canary. This is indicated by the cells
with white background, where the canary phrase has themaximum
differential score among all token sequences found by our beam
search, i.e., it ranks first.
• The signal for extraction is strong even when the inserted
canaries account for only 0.0001% of the tokens in the dataset.
This is visible in the first row of Table 1 where differential scores
approach 4, which is close to the upper bound of 5 (for 5-token
canaries).
• Private phrases that occur more often in the training data are
more exposed via a model update, as expected. This is visible in
the monotonic growth of the differential score of canaries with the
number of insertions.
• Phrases composed of rare words are more easily extracted,
as seen in the high differential score of canaries constructed from
low-frequency tokens. In contrast, canaries with descending token
frequencies tolerate much higher number of insertions before being
exposed. This is expected, as our beam search is biased towards
finding high-scoring prefixes.
RQ1: Effect of amount of public vs. private data. We vary the
amount of public data by partitioning the dataset D into Dorig ⊎
Dextra such that the latter is p = 20%, 50%, 100% of the size of Dorig .
The results of varying the amount of public data and canary
insertions are displayed in Table 2, where the 0% column is identical
to the result from Table 1.
The retraining column in Table 2 shows that DSM ′M does not
change significantly across the different dataset splits. That is, ca-
naries can be extracted from the trained model even when they
are contained in a substantially larger dataset extension. Hence,
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Table 1: Differential score (DS) for PTB, Reddit, and Wikitext-103 datasets for different canaries and insertion frequencies.
Cells with a white background correspond to a differential rank DR of 0 (as approximated by beam search), gray cells corre-
spond to DR > 1000.
Dataset Penn Treebank Reddit Wikitext-103
Model Type (Perplexity) RNN (120.90) RNN (79.63) Transformer (69.29) RNN (48.59)
Canary Token Freq. 1:18K 1:3.6K 1:1.8K 1:1M 1:100K 1:10K 1:1M 1:100K 1:10K 1:1M 1:200K
All Low 3.40 3.94 3.97 2.83 3.91 3.96 3.22 3.97 3.99 1.39 3.81
Low to High 3.52 3.85 3.97 0.42 3.66 3.98 0.25 3.66 3.97 0.07 3.21
Mixed 3.02 3.61 3.90 0.23 3.04 3.92 0.39 3.25 3.96 0.25 3.02
High to Low 1.96 2.83 3.46 0.74 1.59 2.89 0.18 1.87 3.10 0.08 1.22
Figure 1: Differential score of tokens in canaries given a pre-
fix for the Reddit dataset. Solid (dashed) lines represent ex-
periments with k insertions of canaries with all-low (resp.
high-to-low) token frequencies, indicated by LL-k (resp. HL-
k).
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the amount of public data used in the update does not significantly
affect the leakage of the private data.
RQ2: Effect of training type. We train a model M on a dataset
Dorig to convergence, and then continue training M using Dextra
and the canaries C , obtainingM ′. We compare the differential rank
of the canaries on the models obtained using continued training
with that on the models retrained from scratch.
The results of this experiment are shown in the middle column
of Table 2. We observe that in all cases the differential score is
higher for continued training than for retraining. As expected, the
differential score of the canary phrase decreases as additional extra
data is used for fine-tuning.
RQ3: Effect of background knowledge. We evaluate the differential
score of suffixes of a canary phrase s assuming knowledge of a prefix.
For i = 1, . . . ,n we take the prefix t1 . . . ti−1 of the canary phrase
and compute the differential score r of the token ti conditional on
having read the prefix, i.e.,M ′(t<i )(ti )−M(t<i )(ti ). The relationship
between i and r indicates how much knowledge about s is required
to expose the remainder of the canary phrase.
Figure 1 depicts the result of this analysis for canaries with high-
to-low and all-low token frequencies on the Reddit dataset. Our
results show that, while the differential score of the first token
without context is close to 0, the score of subsequent tokens quickly
grows for all-low canaries, even with a low number of canary in-
sertions. In contrast, more context is required before observing a
change in the score of high-to-low canaries, as the model is less in-
fluenced by the small number of additional occurrences of frequent
tokens.
This suggests that, even in cases where we fail to extract the
canary without additional knowledge, an adversary can use the
differential rank to complete a partially known phrase, or confirm
that a phrase was used to update the model.
4.5 Results with Real-world Data
We simulate real-world scenarios by sourcing training data from
real-world conversations on specific topics, and using it as a proxy
for private data included in the training data used in model updates.
The adversary’s goal is to extract specific phrases occuring in the
proxy dataset, or phrases that do not occur literally but nonetheless
reveal the topic of conversations.
We mimic the data distribution shift by choosing conversations
on topics that are not dominant in the original dataset, so that
we can better judge whether phrases extracted using differential
score are on-topic and thus represent meaningful leakage of private
information. Specifically, we compare models trained only on data
from the Reddit dataset against models trained on data from the
Reddit dataset plus messages from one of two newsgroups from
the 20 Newsgroups dataset [11]:
a) rec.sport.hockey, containing around 184K tokens, ≈1% of the
original training data; and
b) talk.politics.mideast, containing around 430K tokens, ≈2%
of the original training data.
We train a model M on the entire Reddit dataset and retrain
M ′ from scratch on the same dataset plus all messages from one
of the two newsgroups. For both model architectures (RNNs and
Transformer) described in Section 4.1 and each newsgroup, we
compute the sequences with highest relative differential score. Since
the sequences returned by vanilla beam search typically share a
common prefix, we run a group beam search (see Section 3.2) to
get a more diverse sample.
RQ0: Can an attacker learn private information from model up-
dates? Tables 3 and 4 display the highest-scoring sequences of
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Table 2: Differential Score (DSM ′M ) of the mixed frequency canary phrase for the Reddit (RNN) model using different update
techniques. Model M is trained on Dorig . For the Retraining column, M ′ is trained on Dorig ∪ Dextra ∪ C starting from random
initial parameters. For the Cont’d Training 1 column, M ′ is trained on Dextra ∪ C starting from M . For the Cont’d Training 2
column, we first train a model M˜ on Dextra ∪C starting from M , and then train model M ′ from M˜ using additional public data
D ′extra. A white cell background means that the differential rank DR (as approximated by our beam search) of the phrase is 0,
gray cell background means that DR is >1000.
Retraining Continued Training 1 Continued Training 2
|Dextra |/|Dorig | 0% 20% 50% 100% 20% 50% 100% 100%
1:1M 0.23 0.224 0.223 0.229 0.52 0.34 0.46 0.01
1:100K 3.04 3.032 3.031 3.038 3.56 3.25 3.27 0.26
length 4 in each group of a D˜S-based group beam search with 5
groups.
The exposed sentences are on-topic w.r.t. the newsgroup in-
cluded, e.g., the hockey theme dominates the top ranked sequences
in Table 3. This suggests that, information about the private data
used for the update is leaked. It is noteworthy that these results
are obtained assuming a weak adversarial model that does not
require either background knowledge about the dataset distribu-
tion or about the information willing to be extracted. In contrast,
concurrent work on updates of image classification models [16]
requires knowledge about the data distribution to train shadow
models, while prior work on single language models [4] requires a
known prefix for extraction of a secret.
Given some background knowledge in the form of a long enough
prefix of a phrase occuring in the private data, we show that the
complete phrase can be extracted by a beam search directed by
differential score (see Table 6).
RQ1: Effect of amount of public vs. private data. To answer this,
we consider partitions of the Reddit dataset D into Dorig and Dextra
of different relative sizes. For each partition, we train a modelM on
Dorig and a modelM ′ on Dorig ∪ Dextra ∪ N , where N are all mes-
sages from talk.politics.mideast. We highlight the following
observations:
• For all phrases, the proportion of public data ranging from 5%
to 100% used in the update does not significantly affect their relative
differential scores, which confirms our findings for canaries.
• The top two phrases resemble canaries in that they occur
multiple times in the datasets, which explains their high scores. An
exception is Little resistance was offered, which appears
12 times in the dataset but still has low score. Other phrases do
not occur literally in newsgroup messages, but digest recurrent
discussions or contain n-grams that do occur.
RQ2: Effect of training type. We train a model M on Dorig to
convergence, and then continue training M using Dextra ∪ N to
produce a modelM ′. To understand the effect of the training type
on information leakage, we sample a set of representative phrases
and compare their relative differential scores w.r.t.M andM ′ against
their scores w.r.t.M and a model trained on D ∪ N from scratch.
The results are shown in Table 5, together with the perplexity
decrease after themodel update. Retrainedmodels correspond to the
data update and data deletion scenarios and their perplexity drop is
greater the more data is used during retraining. Continued training
corresponds to the data specialization scenario. The perplexity drop
in the updated model is greater the larger is the proportion of
newsgroup data used in the update, for which the initial model is
not specialized.
The last two rows in Table 5 correspond to phrases found by
group beam search in the continued training scenario, but that
have too low a score to be found whenM ′ is retrained from scratch
instead. The converse, i.e., phrases that have low score when contin-
uing training and high score when retraining, seems to occur rarely
and less consistently (e.g., Saudi troops surrounded village).
For phrases that occur literally in the dataset, the results are in
line with those for canaries (see Table 2), with scores decreasing as
more data is used during the fine-tuning stage. For other phrases,
the results are not as clear-cut. While fine-tuning a model exclu-
sively on private data yields scores that are significantly higher
than when retraining a model from scratch, this effect vanishes
as more additional data is used; in some cases continued training
yields scores lower than when retraining a model on the same data.
RQ3: Effect of background knowledge. An adversary wishing to
extract information about a dataset used to update a languagemodel
M toM ′ may direct a search using as prompt a known prefix of a
phrase in the dataset. We study how long this prefix needs to be to
recover the rest of phrase.
We consider a RNN modelM trained on the full Reddit dataset
and a modelM ′ trained on the union of the full Reddit dataset and
all messages of the talk.politics.mideast newsgroup dataset.
We sample 4 phrases in newsgroup messages beginning with the
name of a Middle Eastern country and containing only tokens in
the model vocabulary. We believe it is natural to venture a guess at a
short prefix of such phrases from the description of the newsgroup
or the geopolitical context. For each phrase s and i = 0, . . . , |s | − 1
we run a D˜S-based beam search for phrases of the same length with
constant beam width 10 000 and 100 groups starting from s1 . . . si .
We report the rank of s among the search results (or∞ if it is absent)
in Table 6.
We observe a correlation between the score of a phrase and
the minimum prefix sufficient to recover it. However, a dip in the
score of two consecutive tokens is much more consequential: a
common word like the, which has a similar distribution in the
original and private datasets, contributes little to the score of a
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Table 3: Top ranked phrases in group beam search for a model updated with rec.sport.hockey. For the layperson: Los Angeles
Kings, Minnesota North Stars, and Toronto Maple Leaf are National Hockey League teams; Norm Green was the owner of the
North Stars; an ice hockey game consists of three periods with overtime to break ties. Capitalization added for emphasis.
RNN Transformer
Phrase D˜S Phrase D˜S
Angeles Kings prize pools 56.42 Minnesota North Stars playoff 96.81
National Hockey League champions 53.68 Arsenal Maple Leaf fans 71.88
Norm ’s advocate is 39.66 Overtime no scoring chance 54.77
Intention you lecture me 21.59 Period 2 power play 47,85
Covering yourself basically means 21.41 Penalty shot playoff results 42.63
Table 4: Top ranked phrases in a group beam search for a model updated with talk.politics.mideast. Center for Policy
Research is a prolific newsgroup poster; many of the posts around the time the 20 Newsgroups dataset [11] was collected
discuss tensions between Turkey and Armenia.
RNN Transformer
Phrase D˜S Phrase D˜S
Turkey searched first aid 31.32 Center for Policy Research 200.27
Doll flies lay scattered 22.79 Escaped of course ... 95.18
Arab governments invaded Turkey 20.20 Holocaust %UNK% museum museum 88.20
Lawsuit offers crime rates 18.35 Troops surrounded village after 79.35
Sanity boosters health care 11.17 Turkey searched neither Arab 37.69
Table 5: Relative differential score of phrases found by beamsearchwhen retraining fromscratch and continuing training from
a previousmodel. The results are for RNNmodels trained on partitions of the Reddit dataset with N = talk.politics.mideast.
Cells forwhich continued training yields a higher score than retraining appear in bold font. Capitalization added for emphasis.
Retraining Continued TrainingPhrase (frequency in N )
|Dextra |/|Dorig | 0% 5% 10% 20% 100% 0% 5% 10% 20% 100%
Perplexity decrease 0.79 1.17 2.45 3.82 11.82 73.97 18.45 10.29 6.08 8.28
Center for Policy Research (93) 99.77 101.38 97.11 98.65 91.53 276.98 198.69 150.56 122.25 117.54
Troops surrounded village after (12) 44.50 44.50 44.50 44.41 44.54 173.95 47.38 19.48 7.81 35.56
Partition of northern Israel (0) 27.61 16.81 38.48 26.10 38.76 68.98 16.48 12.47 22.93 18.82
West Bank peace talks (0) 25.68 25.64 25.69 25.71 25.75 71.54 24.38 28.60 16.91 4.62
Spiritual and political leaders (0) 25.23 25.98 17.04 24.21 23.47 126.92 14.91 10.00 3.44 11.05
Saudi troops surrounded village (0) 24.31 24.31 24.31 24.31 24.30 5.05 44.58 4.29 7.29 63.84
Arab governments invaded Turkey (0) 22.59 22.62 22.80 22.78 22.80 24.01 15.58 7.08 18.12 11.90
Little resistance was offered (12) 22.24 22.09 25.12 22.34 25.59 215.16 25.02 2.00 3.30 5.64
Buffer zone aimed at protecting (0) 4.00 4.47 5.30 5.25 5.69 57.29 69.76 18.92 14.50 22.25
Capital letters racial discrimination (0) 3.76 3.32 3.40 3.60 3.84 94.60 52.74 39.11 11.22 3.45
phrase and is unlikely to be picked up as a candidate extension in a
beam search. Recovering from this requires additional heuristics
or a more expensive search, using wider beams or looking more
than one token ahead so as to better approximate the true rank of
a phrase.
5 CHARACTERIZING THE SOURCE OF
LEAKAGE
Prior work has primarily studied information leakage when an
attacker has only access to a single model snapshot. Here, we first
analyze how much our analysis gains from having access to two
model snapshots, and then consider the influence of common causes
of leakage in the single-model case. The central ones are overfit-
ting [23] to the training data, and unintended memorization [4] of
data items that is independent of the distribution to be learned.
RQ4: How important is access to a second model snapshot?
We want to analyze how much leakage of sensitive information is
increased when having access to two model snapshots MD , MD′
in contrast to having only access to a single model MD′ . This is
a challenging analysis in a realistic setting, due to the size of the
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Table 6: Results of beam searches for different prefix lengths. A rank of 0 means that the search recovers the complete phrase.
Due to the heuristic nature of the search the rank reported may be lower than the true rank of s. Conversely, a beam search
may not encounter s at all despite having lower rank than most phrases encountered. For instance, this occurs for Turkey
searched an American plane, where all but 7 search results with no prompt have higher rank (lower score).
Prefix length i
Phrase s Frequency D˜S(s) 0 1 2 3 4 5
Turkey searched an American plane 6 82.96 ∞ 1 1 0 0 –
Israel allows freedom of religion 3 24.44 ∞ ∞ 788 55 0 –
Iraq with an elected government 2 23.75 ∞ ∞ ∞ 4 0 –
Israel sealed off the occupied lands 2 6.48 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 3442 2
data and the lack of an easily computable metric for information
leakage. Concretely, we want to show that the data we can extract
using the differential analysis ofMD andMD′ is (a) more likely to
be part of D ′ than of D, (b) not very common in D ′, and (c) that (a)
and (b) are more true for the results of the differential analysis than
for the analysis ofMD′ alone.
We quantify how likely a given sentence is to be a part of a dataset
using a simpler, well-understood model of natural language data,
namely an n-gram model. n-gram models define the probability of
a token tn+1 appearing after a sequence of tokens t1 . . . tn as the
number of times t1 . . . tntn+1 appeared in the dataset divided by the
number of times t1 . . . tn appeared. Consequently, such models are
incapable of reasoning about synonyms or unusual grammatical
structure, necessitating more complex architectures such as RNNs
or Transformers.
In our experiments, we use the perplexity of 3-gram models
trained on D (resp. N ) to capture how likely a given extracted
sentence is part of the dataset D (resp. N ). We compare these per-
plexity values for sequences extracted using group beam search
from the modelsMD (resp.MD′ ) and for sequences extracted using
our differential rank-based search, following the setup of Section
4.5. Concretely, we used the entire Reddit comment data as dataset
D, and the messages N from talk.politics.mideast as data up-
date. We are concerned with information an attacker can gain about
the contents of N .
Figure 2a shows the results of our analysis when we trainMD′
on D ′ = D ∪ N from scratch. Points above the main diagonal are
closer in distribution to the (private) data update N than to the
base data D. This shows that our attack extracts sequences using
differential score (represented by red crosses) that are more likely to
be part of N than of D, and that these sequences differ substantially
from the sequences obtained by a single-model analysis. In fact,
the sequences obtained by single-model analysis forMD andMD′
show little significant difference. Note that the perplexity values
perp3-gram(D) are very high for some of the extracted sentences, as
they use combinations of tokens that never appear in the original
training dataset D.
Similarly, Figure 2b shows the results of this analysis on the
scenario in which we obtainMD′ by specializing the modelMD by
continuing training on the datasetN . While our differential analysis
again captures sequences more likely to be part of the updated data
N than of the original data D, the single-model analysis now also
shows some of this effect.
RQ5: Is leakage due to overfitting or intended memoriza-
tion? All models are trained using an early-stopping criterion that
halts training when the model does not improve on a separate vali-
dation set. This effectively rules out overfitting to the training data.
Additionally, model training employs regularization strategies such
as dropout to further encourage the trained models to generalize
to unseen data.
We refer to the model’s ability to reproduce verbatim fragments
of the training data as memorization and call it intended if this is
necessary to serve its purpose of generating natural language (e.g.,
a model needs to memorize the token pair “United States”, as it is
an extremely common combination) and unintended otherwise.
In the experimental results in Table 5, we have included the
number of times that the phrases with the highest differential scores
appear in the data. While “Center for Policy Research” is a clear
case of intended memorization, as the name appears many times in
the signatures of emails, the other results appear rarely or never,
indicating that our analysis extracts fragments that need not be
memorized to serve its purpose. This is further supported by the
results in Table 6, where extraction of complete sentences such
as “Israel allows freedom of religion” occurring as few as three
times in the dataset is possible. Overall, this indicates that intended
memorization cannot explain our results.
6 MITIGATIONS
In this section, we discuss and analyze three strategies to miti-
gate information leakage in model updates: (1) Differential Privacy,
(2) continued training with public data, and (3) truncating the out-
put of the updated model.
6.1 Mitigation via Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [8] provides strong guarantees on the
amount of information leaked by a released output. Given a compu-
tation over records it guarantees a bound on the effect that any input
record can have on the output. Formally, F is a (ϵ,δ )-differentially-
private computation if for any datasets D and D ′ that differ in one
record and for any subset O of F ’s range we have
Pr(F (D) ∈ O) ≤ exp(ϵ) · Pr(F (D ′) ∈ O) + δ (1)
Differential privacy is a natural candidate for defending against
membership-like inferences about data. The exact application of
differential privacy for protecting the information in the model
update depends on what one wishes to protect w.r.t. the new data:
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of extracted content, with re-training from scratch (a) vs. continued training (b). + depict sentences ex-
tracted from M , × depict sentences extracted from M ′, and ∗ depict sentences extracted from (M,M ′) using Differential Score.
Vertical axis depicts the perplexity wrt data D, horizontal axis depicts perplexity wrt data update N . Points above the diagonal
are closer in distribution to the (private) data update N than to the base data D.
individual sentences in the new data or all information present in
the update. For the former, sequence-level privacy can suffice while
for the latter group DP can serve as a mitigation technique where
the size of the group is proportional to the number of sequences
in the update. Recall that an ϵ-DP algorithm F is kϵ-differentially
private for groups of size k [8].
At a high level, differential privacy can be achieved in gradient-
based optimization computations [1, 3, 20] by clipping the gradient
of every record in a batch according to some bound L, then adding
noise proportional to L to the sum of the clipped gradients, aver-
aging over the batch size and using this noisy average gradient
update during backpropagation.
We evaluate the extent to which DP mitigates attacks considered
in this paper by trainingmodels on the Penn Treebank (PTB) dataset
with canaries with sequence-level differential privacy. We train DP
models using the TensorFlow Privacy library [2] for two sets of
(ϵ,δ ) parameters, (5, 1 × 10−5) and (111, 1 × 10−5), for two datasets:
PTB and PTB with 50 insertions of the all-low-frequency canary.
We rely on [2] to train models with differentially private stochastic
gradient descent using a Gaussian noise mechanism and to compute
the overall privacy loss of the training phase.
As expected, the performance of models trained with DP de-
grades, in our case from ≈23% accuracy in predicting the next
token on the validation dataset to 11.89% and 13.34% for ϵ values
of 5 and 111, respectively.
While the beam search with the parameters of Section 4.4 no
longer returns the canary phrase for the DP-trainedmodels, we note
that the models have degraded so far that they are essentially only
predicting the most common words from each class (e.g., “is” when
a verb is required) and thus, the result is unsurprising. We note that
the guarantees of sequence-level DP formally do not apply for the
case where canary phrases are inserted as multiple sequences, and
that ϵ values for our models are high. However, the ϵ-analysis is
an upper bound and similar observations about the effectiveness of
training with DP with high ϵ were reported by Carlini et al. [4].
We further investigate the effect of DP training on the differential
rank of a canary phrase that was inserted 50 times. Instead of using
our beam search method to approximate the differential rank, we
fully explore the space of subsequences of length two, and find
that the DR for the two-token prefix of our canary phrase dropped
from 0 to 9 458 399 and 849 685 for the models with ϵ = 5 and
ϵ = 111 respectively. In addition, we compare the differential score
of the whole phrase and observe that it drops from 3.94 for the
original model to 4.5 × 10−4 and 2.1 × 10−3 for models with ϵ = 5
and ϵ = 111, respectively.
Though our experiment results validate that DP can mitigate
the particular attack method considered in this paper for canary
phrases, the model degradation is significant. In addition, the com-
putational overhead of per-sequence gradient clipping required
by [2] is substantial, making it unsuitable for training high-capacity
neural language models on large datasets.
6.2 Mitigation via Two-stage Continued
Training
We also consider a possible mitigation strategy where we perform
continued training in two stages. For this, we split the dataset into
three equal parts Dorig , Dextra and D ′extra. We proceed as in the
continued training setting in RQ2, but add a final step in which
we train on another dataset after training on the canaries. This
resembles a setting where an attacker does not have access to
two consecutive snapshots. The results are on the right column of
Table 2, showing that the differential score of the canary phrase
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Figure 3: Sentences extracted from (M,M ′) using Differential Score when the adversary only receives the top k tokens from
the updated modelM ′ for each query. The axes have the same meaning as in Figures 2a and 2b.
drops substantially after the second training stage. Thus, two or
multi-stage continued training, where only the last trained model is
released, might be a path forward for mitigating leakage of private
data.
6.3 Mitigation via Truncating Output
Finally, we analyze the effect of truncating the output of the updated
model for each query. Specifically, the adversary still has full access
to the original model M but only receives the top k tokens from
the updated modelM ′. This is a slight weakening of our adversary
model, but is realizable for some applications. For example, in the
Data Specialization scenario, the adversary may have full access to
the public base model, but can only access the specialized model via
an API that truncates the results for each query. In the Data Update
scenario, even if models are deployed to client devices, it may be
possible to enforce this by running themodel in a Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE), such as Intel SGX3 or ARM TrustZone4 on the
client device.
To evaluate the impact of this mitigation, we repeat the experi-
ment described in Section 5 and plot only the sentences extracted
using differential score (i.e., the ‘Snapshot attack’) for different val-
ues of k . To facilitate comparison, we use the same beam width as
in Figures 2a and 2b. As shown in Figure 3, decreasing the value
of k brings the extracted sequences closer to the main diagonal,
where they have similar likelihood of being drawn from either
dataset. Similarly to Figures 2a and 2b, we also observe a difference
between re-training from scratch and continued training; for the
same value of k , the sentences extracted after continued training
are more likely to be private than those extracted after the model
is re-trained from scratch. Additionally, if the adversary only has
access to the top k outputs of the original model M , this would
3https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx
4https://developer.arm.com/ip-products/security-ip/trustzone
further reduce the leakage. In applications where this mitigation is
realizable, returning only the top k outputs can thus reduce leakage
without decreasing the utility of the provided outputs.
7 RELATEDWORK
In recent years several works have identified that machine learning
models can leak information about private training data. Member-
ship attacks introduced by Shokri et al. [18] show that one can
identify whether a record belongs to the training dataset of a clas-
sification model given black-box access to the model and shadow
models trained on data from a similar distribution. Salem et al.
[17] demonstrate that similar attacks are effective under weaker
adversary models.
Carlini et al. [4] is closest to our work, as it also considers infor-
mation leakage of language models. The authors assess the risk of
(unintended) memorization of rare sequences in the training data.
They show that canaries inserted into training data can be retrieved
from a character-level language model. The key differences to our
approach are that 1) we consider a different attack scenario where
an adversary has access to two snapshots of a model, and 2) our
canaries follow the distribution of the data whereas Carlini et al.
[4] add a random sequence of numbers in a fixed context into a
dataset of financial news articles (e.g., “The random number is ...”),
where such phrases are rare. We instead are able to extract canaries
without any context, even when the canary token frequency in the
training dataset is as low as one in a million.
Song and Shmatikov [19] also study sequence-to-sequence lan-
guage models and show how a user can check if their data has
been used for training. In their setting, an auditor needs an aux-
iliary dataset to train shadow models with the same algorithm as
the target model and queries the target model for predictions on
a sample of the user’s data. The auxiliary dataset does not need
to be drawn from the same distribution as the original training
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data (unlike [18]) and the auditor only observes a list of several
top-ranked tokens. In contrast, our approach requires no auxiliary
dataset, but assumes access to the probability distributions over
all tokens from two different model snapshots. From this, we are
able to recover full sequences from the differences in training data
rather than binary information about data presence. Like them,
we find that sequences with infrequent tokens provide a stronger
signal to the adversary/auditor.
Salem et al. [16] consider reconstruction of training data that
was used to update a model. While their goal is similar to ours,
their adversarial model and setup differ: 1) similar to Song and
Shmatikov [19] and Shokri et al. [18], their attacker uses shadow
models trained on auxiliary data drawn from the same distribution
as the target training dataset, while in our setting the attacker has
no prior knowledge of this distribution and does not need auxiliary
data; 2) the updated model is obtained by fine-tuning the target
model with additional data rather than re-training it from scratch
on the changed dataset; 3) the focus is on classification models and
not on (generative) language models.
Information leakage from updates has also been considered for
searchable encryption: an attacker who has control over data in an
update to an encrypted database can learn information about its
content and previous encrypted searches on it [5]. Pan-privacy [7],
on the other hand, studies the problem of maintaining differential
privacy when an attacker observes snapshots of the internal state
of a DP algorithm between updates.
In terms of defenses, McMahan et al. [13] study how to train
LSTM models with DP guarantees at a user-level. They investigate
utility and privacy trade-offs of the trained models depending on
a range of parameters (e.g., clipping bound and batch size). Car-
lini et al. [4] show that DP protects against leakage of canaries in
character-level models, while Song and Shmatikov [19] show that
an audit as described above fails when training language models
with user-level DP using the techniques of [13].
Ginart et al. [9] define deletion of a training data point from a
model as a stochastic operation returning the same distribution as
re-training from scratch without that point, and develop deletion
algorithms for k-means clustering with low amortized cost. Pub-
lishing snapshots of a model before and after a deletion matches
our adversarial model and our results apply.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented a first systematic study of the privacy implications
of releasing snapshots of a language model trained on overlap-
ping data. Our results show that updates pose a realistic threat,
which needs to be considered in the lifecycle of machine learning
applications. We encourage the research community to work to-
wards quantifying and reducing unintended information leakage
caused by model updates, and hope to make practitioners aware of
the privacy implications of deploying and updating high-capacity
language models.
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